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We conduct an experimental study to investigate the causal impact of social identity on individuals‟ 
response to economic incentives. We focus on China‟s decades old household registration system, or the 
hukou institution, which categorizes citizens into urban and rural residents, and favors the former over 
the latter in resource allocation.  Our results indicate that making individuals‟ hukou status salient and 
public significantly reduces the performance of rural migrant students on an incentivized cognitive task 
by 10 percent. This leads to a leftward shift of their earnings distribution – the proportion of rural 
migrants  below  the  25
th  earnings  percentile  increases  significantly  by  almost  19  percentage  points. 
However,  among  non-migrants  the  proportion  with  earnings  below  the    25
th  percentile  drops  by  5 
percentage points, and the proportion above the 75
th percentile increases by almost 8 percentage points, 
albeit insignificantly. The results demonstrate the impact of institutionally imposed social identity on 
individuals‟ intrinsic response to incentives, and consequently on widening income inequality.  
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1.  Introduction 
A large body of literature documents significant and increasing income inequities in the fastest growing 
economies of the world (in China: Kanbur and Zhang, 1999; Chen, 2002; Yao, Zhang and Hanmer, 2004; 
Ravallion and Chen, 2007; in India: Deaton and Dreze, 2002; Datt and Ravallion, 2002). Empirical 
research suggests that rising income inequality lowers poverty reduction at any given positive rate of 
growth (Ravallion, 1997). If we incorporate the psychology and sociology of an individual‟s identity 
into economic models of behavior, however, the implications of socio-economic inequality may be much 
wider.  For  instance,  Akerlof  and  Kranton  (2000)  incorporate  individuals‟  social  identity  into  a 
theoretical  model  of  poverty  and  show  that  social  exclusion  can  lead  to  equilibria  in  which  the 
„excluded‟ individuals avoid economic activities that are remunerative. Thus identifying oneself with an 
underclass can perpetuate and exacerbate socio-economic inequities. 
In this paper we attempt to expand the literature on social identity by analyzing its potential impact 
on economic inequality in an experimental framework. We  focus on China‟s household registration 
system, or the hukou institution, which categorizes citizens into urban (nonagricultural) residents and 
rural  (agricultural)  residents,  and  favors  the  former  in  resource  allocation.  We  study  whether  an 
individual‟s social identity is influenced by this institution and has a causal impact on her response to 
incentives. If yes, how does the response to incentives affect individuals‟ performance on cognitive tasks 
and thereby the distribution of earnings among these different socio-economic groups?   
The  hukou system in China  is uniquely  positioned  to shed  new light  on  these questions. The 
system  of  assigning  agricultural  households  a  rural  status  and  thereby  restricting  their  access  to 
subsidized public goods and job opportunities for generations emerged after the communist revolution 
six decades ago. Thus, unlike race, caste or ethnicity, migrant identity in urban China may have been 
administratively created and reinforced through decades of differential treatment of rural-urban residents. 
We, therefore, have an opportunity to test whether even in an otherwise ethnically homogenous society 4 
 
(China‟s  population  is  91.5  percent  ethnic  Han,  National  Bureau  of  Statistics  1994-2003)  systemic 
disparity between households may have been internalized by individuals through a manifestation of their 
social identity. If yes, this provides us with powerful evidence on the impact of social exclusion in 
creating identities. Further, this internalized identity may influence individuals‟ response to incentives in 
the market economy and hence affect their economic decisions and outcomes. If so, the intrinsically 
distorted response to incentives could serve as an important, yet unexplored, avenue through which 
social identities may contribute to socio-economic inequality. 
We design a framed field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) to explore the effect of the hukou 
institution on individuals‟ incentives. To introduce an exogenous variation in identity salience we adopt 
a methodology from psychology called priming (Bargh, 2006). Specifically, our experiment randomly 
assigns primary school students in Beijing, with different hukou backgrounds, to the identity treatment 
and the control treatment. In the identity treatment we prime students‟ hukou identity and make it salient 
through a pre-experiment questionnaire followed by a public verification of their hukou status (Shih, 
Pittinsky  and  Ambady,  1999;  Hoff  and  Pandey,  2006).  In  the  control  treatment  individual‟s  hukou 
identity is  kept  private.  We  then  compare  participants‟  performance  in  incentivized  cognitive  tasks, 
solving  puzzles,  between  the  two  treatments  in  order  to  examine  the  effects  of  hukou  identity  on 
economic inequality.  
Our results indicate that when rural migrant students‟  „inferior‟ hukou status is made salient and 
public, they significantly underperform by 10 percent in the incentivized cognitive task compared to 
when their identity is kept private. The performance of local urban students, the „high‟ status hukou 
holders,  insignificantly  improves  when  their  hukou  status  is  primed.  Although  these  changes  in 
individual  behavior  have  an  insignificant  impact  on  aggregate  efficiency,  the  significant 
underperformance  by  rural  migrant  students  leads  to  a  drastic  shift  in  the  experimental  earnings 5 
 
distribution. The ranking of rural migrant students in the earnings distribution shifts to the left – the 
proportion of rural migrant students below the 25
th percentile increases significantly from 11.9 percent to 
30.3 percent. In contrast, when hukou identity is primed the proportion of urban students below the 25
th 
percentile drops from 22.2 percent to 17.2 percent, and the proportion above the 75
th percentile increases 
by  almost  8  percentage  points,  albeit  insignificantly.  We  conclude  that  the  hukou  system  distorts 
individuals‟ response to incentives and may have a causal impact on widening the income gap between 
migrants and non-migrants in urban China. 
The  findings  of  this  paper  have  two  important  implications.  First,  theoretical  and  empirical 
literature suggests that high levels of inequality may have adverse implications for economic growth 
(Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alessina and Rodrik, 1994). Our results, thus, highlight the importance of 
designing  policies  that  ensure  inclusive  and  sustainable  economic  growth  in  developing  countries. 
Second,  the  findings  underline  the  need  for  more  research  on  the  impact  of  social  exclusion  on 
individual behavior and the effectiveness of existing redistributive policies that aim at reducing social 
exclusion.  For  instance,  while  affirmative  action  has  generated  tremendous  policy  debate,  there  is 
limited evidence of its impact on social cohesion as well as economic efficiency.  
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 places this study in the 
context of existing literature. Section 3 provides a brief background on the hukou system in China. 
Section 4 describes the experimental design and the data. The results of the analysis and its discussion 
are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.     Literature Review 
The importance of incorporating social identity into economic analyses is being increasingly stressed in 
economics (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). An expanding theoretical (Smith, 2005; Shayo, 2005; Fang and 6 
 
Loury, 2005; Benabou and Tirole, 2007; Horst, Kirman and Teschl, 2006) and experimental literature 
suggests that making identity salient has important effects on individuals‟ preferences and economic 
behavior (Ball et al., 2001; Benjamin, Choi and Strickland, forthcoming).  
However, there is little empirical research on the impact of social identity on economic outcomes 
in developing countries, with one exception. In a study in rural India, Hoff and Pandey (2006) find that 
social identity – a product of history and culture – shapes one‟s belief system and has a pronounced 
impact on behavior in response to economic incentives through its effect on expectations. They show 
that  making  caste  salient  to  middle  school  male  students  lowers  the  performance  of  low-caste 
participants relative to high-castes even when rewards for performance depend solely on individual 
effort. Thus social identity may have important implications for economic inequality and the distribution 
of gains from economic growth in developing countries.         
Concerns  about  rising  economic  inequality  accompanying  rapid  economic  growth  have  been 
growing in recent years. In China, income inequality has risen significantly since economic reforms 
were initiated in 1978 (Ravallion and Chen, 2007; Yao, Zhang and Hanmer, 2004; Chen, 2002; Kanbur 
and Zhang, 1999). While the contribution of rural-urban inequality to overall income inequality was 
about 70 percent over 1983-1995, the contribution of intra-urban inequality has increased by 96 percent 
over the same period (Kanbur and Zhang, 1999). Behind these inequality statistics lie rapid urbanization 
(Ravallion and Chen, 2007) and the accompanying  labor migration from rural to urban areas – the 
largest  in  world  history.  According  to  the  5th  Population  Census  conducted  in  2000,  about  144.39 
million rural residents, or 11.6 percent of the total population of China, migrated into cities and towns in 
that year (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2002). China‟s unique hukou or household registration 
system, however, does not grant migrants urban citizenship. This „floating‟ population, a majority of 
who are unskilled rural laborers (Kanbur and Zhang, 1999), is treated as an „outsider‟ with limited 7 
 
access to economic resources and opportunities (Liu, 2005).  
Research suggests that on average those with a rural hukou are socio-economically worse-off than 
those with an urban hukou in China. Using a national representative sample from the Chinese Household 
Income Project (1995), Liu (2005) finds that compared to urban residents those who obtained urban 
hukou later in their lives have significantly lower educational attainment and healthcare benefits. Lu and 
Song  (2006)  conduct  an  individual-level  survey  to  find  that  local  urban  workers  in  Tianjin  earn 
substantially higher hourly wage than those who do not have local urban hukou. In a recent study, 
Whalley  and  Zhang  (2007)  show  that  removing  hukou  barriers  to  domestic  labor  mobility  will 
significantly  reduce  inequality  and  increase  economic  efficiency  gains.  However,  there  exists  little 
evidence on the causal effect of hukou status on economic behavior and income distribution in China. 
Secondary sources of data based on either surveys or direct field observations to test whether the 
differences in the economic outcomes are due to hukou status are unable to establish causality between 
hukou status and perceptions of self and economic behavior due to confounding unobservable individual 
characteristics.  The  current  literature  almost  entirely  focuses  on  restricted  labor  mobility  and 
discrimination in the allocation of economic resources in the hukou system as an explanation for rural-
urban and intra-urban economic inequities (Liu, 2005; Lu and Song, 2006; Whalley and Zhang, 2007). 
Moreover, existing research does not provide a complete picture of the extent of urban inequality in 
China, primarily due to paucity of data. The presence of the household registration system implies that 
only  permanent  or  registered  urban  households  are  included  in  official  survey  data,  thereby 
underestimating urban income inequality (Ravallion and Chen, 2007).  
This study aims to contribute to the literature on social identity and inequality in the following 
ways. First, we show how social identities can  causally impact individual decision making even in 
relatively  ethnically  homogenous  societies.  Second,  our  study  will  highlight  the  role  of  identity  in 8 
 
perpetuating  and  exacerbating  income  inequities,  particularly  in  the  context  of  rapidly  growing 
economies.   
 
3.  The Hukou System and Social Identity in China 
The  household  registration  or  hukou  system  as  it  is  known  today  evolved  gradually  following  the 
success of the communist revolution in China in 1949. It provided the main mechanism whereby the 
new communist government regulated the mobility of its citizens until the end of the 1970s. Restricted 
labor  mobility  was  deemed  necessary  for  implementing  the  government‟s  strategy  of  prioritizing 
industrial growth by keeping the proportion of non-agricultural population low. Under this system every 
citizen was legally bound to register her or his single permanent place of residence (hukou suozaidi) say 
city x in province y, and the type of hukou (hukou leibie) which was either agricultural (rural) or non-
agricultural (urban). Strict controls were imposed on movement of rural hukou holders to urban areas 
(Mallee, 1995).
1 While temporary residence in rural areas (by an urban  hukou holder) did not require 
registration, a temporary residence certificate was required in order for a rural hukou holder to stay 
longer  than  three  days  in  an  urban  location.  These  rules  were  enforced  strictly  thereby  controlling 
mobility, both temporary and permanent, from rural to urban areas. 
  By  controlling  rural-to-urban  labor  mobility,  between  the  1950s  and  1970s,  the  system 
perpetuated  discrimination  against  rural  hukou  holders.  First,  urban  employment  was  primarily 
determined by the prospective employees‟ hukou status which favored urban residents (Chan and Zhang, 
1999).  Second,  state-subsidized  food  and  other  necessities  were  distributed  preferentially  to  urban 
                                                        
1 A migration certificate had to be obtained, in addition to presenting proof of urban employment or 
enrolment in an urban educational institution or proof of grant of in-migration by urban authorities to the 
household registration office (Mallee, 1995).  9 
 
residents through a national rationing system. Urban hukou holders were eligible for the ration stamps 
that guaranteed low price products but not rural hukou holders (Liu, 2005).  Third, urban residents 
(particularly employees of the state-owned enterprises) were granted various fringe benefits including 
subsidized housing, health services and education. In contrast, such benefits to rural residents were 
provided by their communes or villages, which were usually of inferior quality and whose availability 
and reliability varied widely (Lin, Cai and Li 1996; Cheng and Selden, 1994).   
A household‟s hukou was (and continues to be) inherited by the next generation. Hukou status and 
thereby educational attainment and eventually employment opportunities of the next generation of rural 
populace was restricted by birth.
2 Thus the institution divided the Chinese population into two social 
groups: an agricultural population which was socio -economically disadvantaged compared to the non-
agricultural population (Chan and Zhang, 1999). 
Following China‟s transition from a centralized to a market economy starting in the late 1970s, the 
hukou system gradually lost its control over spatial migration (Chan and Zhang, 1999). The number of 
people migrating in search of jobs surged following market reforms (and abolition of communes) and an 
easing of government regulations on spatial migration. As a result, the past three decades have witnessed 
a drastic increase in the number of „temporary‟ non-hukou residents (either registered or non-registered) 
in urban centers.
3 These migrants or temporary residents are not entitled to urban benefits unless they 
convert to a full u rban  hukou.  While  pilot  programs  granting  permanent  urban  residency  to  rural 
migrants in certain small cities and townships (subject to job and residency requirements) have been 
                                                        
2 Before 1998, the children of rural-urban couples had to follow the mothers‟ hukou status (Chan and 
Zhang, 1999). They are now allowed to inherit either the father‟s or the mother‟s hukou. 
3 Temporary Residence Certificates (TRC) are usually valid for one year and are renewable (Chan and 
Zhang, 1999) 10 
 
recently approved, in medium and large cities, which are more attractive for rural migrants, conversion 
to an urban hukou is daunting if not impossible for an average rural migrant. These conversions are 
granted through very limited channels including direct purchase of an urban hukou as local governments 
seek additional revenue sources following China‟s fiscal decentralization in the 1980s (Lin and Liu, 
2000).
4 
As of  when this  study was conducted,  the  following major and  persistent  gaps between rural 
migrants and urban residents continued to exist in large urban centers: (1) labor market and occupational 
segregation: employment in government offices and state-owned enterprises in cities continued to be 
unavailable  to rural migrant workers unless they  converted  to  an  urban  hukou;  (2)  lack  of  social 
insurance benefits for rural migrant workers such as unemployment and health benefits; (3) absence of 
state subsidized social welfare benefits. In addition, government subsidized low-rent housing in large 
cities is only available for local urban hukou holders. That these socio-economic gaps created by the 
hukou  institution  persist to  this day  is  evident in  the  Chinese Premier  Wen  Jiabao‟s address to  the 
National People‟s Congress in March 2010 promising to reform the household registration system and 
                                                        
4 Chan and Zhang (1999) list the channels for converting one‟s hukou: recruitment by state-owned 
enterprises, promotion to a senior administrative position, enrollment in higher education institutions, 
demobilization from military services and land requisition by the state. All are controlled by the state‟s 
labor laws and have fixed quotas. Besides the fact that quotas can be very small, it is also possible that 
only one family member recruited by the state is permitted to move to the urban locale and thereby 
separated from her (his) family for long periods. Since 1992 urban hukous are also sold for high fees but 
eligibility is limited to investors, property buyers and professionals. In Shanghai in 1997, for instance, 
an urban hukou could be purchased for ¥ (yuan) 1 million (which was 150 times an average rural 
migrant‟s income) and after meeting strict job, residential and legal requirements (Wang and Zuo, 1999)! 11 
 
bridge the divide between rural migrants and non-migrants.
5 
It is important to realize that these factors, along with the resulting social segregation of migrants, 
suggest that the experience of a rural migrant in China is not transitory like in other developing countries 
(Chan, 1996; Solinger, 1999). Geographical control of rural populace until the 1970s has been replaced 
by economic and social divisions between rural and urban hukou holders within urban areas of China. 
The  social  hierarchy,  shaped  by  the  institution  of  hukou  and  made  conspicuous  by  vast  migrant 
populations in fast-growing cities, has affected people‟s daily life so ubiquitously that it constitutes an 
important aspect of one‟s social identity in urban China even today.  
The Hukou System and Schooling in Urban China 
Since  our  subjects  in  the  experimental  study  are  public  school  students  with  different  hukou 
backgrounds, in this subsection we discuss the hukou institution‟s effects on the schooling system in 
urban China. 
Children  are  entitled  to  subsidized  public  education  only  in  the  area  of  their  legal  permanent 
residency. Even after the reforms in the hukou system, in most cities non-local hukou holders cannot 
enroll their children in local schools unless the schools have quotas for „guest‟ students. These „guests‟ 
                                                        
5 “…We will carry out reform of the household registration system and relax requirements for household 
registration in towns and small and medium-sized cities. We will solve employment and living problems 
rural migrant workers face in cities and towns in a planned and step-by-step manner, and gradually 
ensure that they receive the same treatment as urban residents in areas such as pay, children‟s education, 
healthcare, housing, and social security….We will allow eligible workers who have left agricultural 
work to gradually become urban residents, and develop a beautiful rural environment where farmers can 
live a happy life.” 
URL: http://english.gov.cn/official/2010-03/15/content_1556124_9.htm. 12 
 
usually  have  to  pay  higher  fees  than  local  hukou  holders  which  can  be  a  significant  proportion  of 
migrants‟ incomes (Xinhua News Agency, July, 2002).
6 Private schools exclusively for migrant children 
are typically opposed by local authorities, or stringent physical and financial requirements are imposed 
on them to obtain a legal status. In several urban areas private migrant schools are, therefore, considered 
illegal. 
There are four categories of students to be found in public schools admitting both local and non -
local hukou students. Due to the hukou classification system, urban areas contain both non-agricultural 
and agricultural hukou population (Chan and Zhang, 1999). Thus the population in large cities such as 
                                                        
6  Quoting the Xinhua report: “According to statistics from Beijing educational authorities, there are now 
123 schools set up by migrants accommodating over 17, 000 children in the capital city. These schools 
teach between 20 and 3,000 students each and charge about ¥300 (US$36.1) each term. When migrant 
children go to public schools, their parents have to pay ¥500 (60.2 US dollars) in tuition fees each term, 
plus ¥1,000 (120.5 US dollars) for selection of the school and ¥1,000 to ¥30,000 (3614.5 US dollars) as 
sponsorship… Migrant schools are cheap and affordable for migrant workers. And children here don’t 
suffer from the discrimination they face in public schools, because they have similar family 
backgrounds…  Beijing‟s educational authorities (have) decided to cut charges for teaching migrant 
children in public schools in the upcoming school year. Fees for primary school will be reduced to ¥200 
(24.1 U.S. dollars) from the previous ¥500, and for secondary school to ¥500, a 50 percent drop from the 
previous charge.” (http://www.10thnpc.org.cn/english/China/36594.htm).  
Migrant laborers in Chinese cities earn an average of ¥966 per month in 2006 according to a National 




Beijing and Shanghai (also called municipalities and equivalent to a province) usually consist of four 
different hukou categories: local urban, non-local urban, local rural, and non-local rural hukou holders. 
Although the latter three are on average socio-economically disadvantaged relative to the local urban 
hukou holders, they fare differently amongst themselves.      
Non-local rural hukou holders are migrants from rural areas of provinces outside the municipality. 
Since,  on  average,  they  are  likely  to  be  less  educated,  have  lower  paying  jobs,  and  live  in  poorer 
conditions compared to their urban counterparts, they are usually considered to be at the bottom of the 
social hierarchy within the municipality. Local rural hukou holders are residents of the rural areas of the 
municipality.  Non-local  urban  migrants,  i.e.,  permanent  urban  residents  from  economically  less-
developed cities, are on average relatively more educated than their rural counterparts, more likely to 
have white-collar jobs and be better paid. But the comparison of socio-economic status between local 
rural and non-local urban is not clear. Due to this ambiguity and the constraints we faced in subject 
recruiting, we excluded the local rural and non-local urban hukou holders from this study, and focused 
on the two sharply disparate groups. Specifically, since our experiment was conducted in Beijing, we 
considered Beijing urban (hereafter High) and non-Beijing rural (hereafter Low) hukou holders in this 
study.   
4.  Experimental Design 
Our experiment adopts the design of Hoff and Pandey (2006). On the one hand we manipulate hukou 
salience – subjects‟ hukou status is made salient and public in the identity treatment, and is kept private 
in  the  control  treatment.  On  the  other  hand,  we  vary  the  payment  regime  by  using  piece  rate  and 
tournament games in both control and treatment groups. We elaborate on the experimental design below, 
starting with discussion on subject selection which is a crucial part of the study‟s design. 
Selection of subjects  Participants in our experiment were 8-12 year old students recruited at 14 
 
four elementary public schools in Beijing. Since at the time of enrollment evidence of a student‟s hukou 
status was required to determine the amount of tuition and other miscellaneous fees,  individual hukou 
records  were  available and  were  obtained  by us  in  advance  from  the  schools‟ registrar‟s  office  for 
subject selection.
7 We chose these  schools for our study because they  suited the requirements of our 
experiment on several  fronts.  First, the schools admitted non -Beijing  hukou  students.  Second,  the 
proportion of students from migrant families was comparable to the migrant population of the Beijing 
metropolitan area.
8 Finally, these schools were located in districts where per capita GDP was comparable 
to the average in the Beijing municipal area.  
The study focuses on primary school students rather than adults for several reasons. First , the 
validity of the assumption of exogenous hukou declines with age since the possibility of rural-to-urban 
hukou conversion increases with one‟s level of education. Thus, focusing on young individuals allows us 
to  avoid  using  selective  samples  of  people  whose  decision  to  migrate  to  urban  areas  may  be 
systematically correlated with their abilities and intrinsic preferences. Second, the ideal subjects for our 
experiment  would  be  those  whose  hukou  status  cannot  be  differentiated  a  priori  from  observable 
characteristics so that any difference in average outcomes between the identity and control treatments 
can be solely attributed to the identity prime in the „laboratory‟. Using adult subjects may introduce 
potential  confounds  since  observable  characteristics  –accent  and  clothing  –usually  provide  clues  to 
where the subjects originate from and give away their hukou status even in the absence of the hukou 
                                                        
7 Specifically, the miscellaneous fee in the spring semester of 2007 was ¥80 for the local urban students, 
compared to ¥40 for the non-local rural students. The schools usually charge other off-the-record fees to 
the non-local rural students. 
8 Migrants who resided in Beijing for more than 6 months constituted 23 percent of Beijing‟s total 
population in 2005 (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2005). 15 
 
identity prime.
9 Since our subjects wore identical school uniforms and relative to adults the young tend 
to pick up local accents easily, the choice of subject pool ensured that it was difficult to observationally 
infer one‟s hukou type. Finally, a growing number of experimental economics studies show that any 
difference between the behavior of children and adults is insignificant when it comes to rational choice 
behavior,  altruism,  and  strategic  behavior  (Harbaugh  et  al.,  2001;  Harbaugh  and  Krause,  2000). 
Although our sample was young, almost all participants in the experiment understood what their hukou 
status was.   
We recruited subjects from among 3-6 graders at three schools and among 3-5 graders in one.
10 
Each session of the experiment consisted of six subjects of the same gender with three from each of the 
H and L hukou types. To ensure that the effect of identity, if any, comes purely from the identity prime 
great effort was exerted to minimize the probability that students knew one another a priori when we 
assign them to experimental sessions. To do this, we obtained the student roster from the schools and 
stratified the sample by gender, grade, grade section, and hukou type. Then the three students of the 
same hukou type were randomly selected, each from a different grade.
11 The two students from the same 
                                                        
9 Although China is ethnically homogeneous, people from different geographic regions have their own 
local dialects, or speak mandarin with dramatically different accents.  
10 We were unable to obtain school permission to recruit the 6
th graders at the fourth school because of 
upcoming middle school entrance exams.  
11 At the school where only 3 -5 graders were recruited, each of the three H students was randomly 
selected from a different grade, and so were the three L students.  Then the two students from the same 
grade (hence by design had  different hukou types) were selected from different class sections.  The 
similar method was used when we recruited 3-6 graders at the other three schools. To further reduce the 
probability of prior acquaintance at these three schools, we made sure that one H student and one L 16 
 
grade (with different hukou types) were randomly selected, each from a different class section.
  The 
sessions in both treatments were formed in the same way.  
Identity manipulation  The identity treatment and control treatment differ only in the use of the 
approach  in  psychology  of  identity  manipulation  called  priming.  Priming  introduces  certain  stimuli 
(called  „primes‟  including  image,  audio,  or  text  such  as  a  questionnaire  and  an  article)  to  activate 
subjects‟  knowledge  of  social  structures  (see  Bargh,  2006  for  a  review).  A  large  body  of  work  in 
psychology shows that priming social identities often influence people‟s behavior and attitudes beyond 
their  awareness  and  control  (Bargh  and  Chartrand,  1999).  Identity  priming  has  only  recently  been 
adopted  in  the  field  of  economics  to  study  the  effects  of  social  identity  on  individual  behavior 
(Benjamine, Choi and Strickland, forthcoming; Hoff and Pandey, 2006).   
In this study, we made hukou identity salient in the identity treatment by using a survey and 
publicly  verifying  subjects‟  hukou  status  at  the  beginning  of  the  experiment,  while  in  the  control 
treatment subjects‟ hukou identity was private and not primed. In the pre-experiment survey used only in 
the identity treatment, subjects were asked where they were born, whether they spoke Beijing dialect at 
home, whether they (or their classmates or teachers) considered themselves as a Beijing local, and how 
much miscellaneous fees they were charged by the school at the beginning of the semester. They were 
also  asked  to  compare  Beijing  local  students  with  „guest‟  students  on  academic  performance,  class 
participation,  extracurricular  activities  and  achievement,  and  daily  spending.  After  the  survey  the 
experimenter verified in public with every student his/her name, month and date of birth as well as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
student came from two different grades. For example, if H students were recruited from grades 3, 5, and 
6, L students were then selected from grades 3, 4, and 6. Again the two students from the same grade 
were selected from different class sections. The average number of class sections per grade was 3.3. The 
size of a class section varied from 24 to 68 students, with a mean size of 35.8. 17 
 
hukou background.
12  In the control treatment, the sessions started with neither the survey nor the public 
verification  of  hukou  and  proceeded  directly  to  the  experimenter‟s  illustration  of  how  to  solve  the 
assigned cognitive task.   
Incentivized cognitive task  The  experiment  was  conducted  in  a  standard  classroom  setting 
with six subjects (3 H and 3 L type) seated at separate desks with a fairly large distance from one another. 
Before  the  experiment  started  participants  were  greeted  by  a  female  experimenter  and  each  paid  3 
Chinese yuan (¥3) participation fee upon arrival.
13 The experimenter then explained the tasks and rules. 
We followed Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini  (2003), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), and Hoff and 
Pandey (2006) in adopting the maze puzzles from Yahoo! games.
14 A sample maze with the solution is 
included in Appendix A. The task was to find a path through the field from one side to the other without 
crossing the walls (solid lines in the figure). The experimenter explained the rules using a simple maze, 
and showed how to solve another one of similar difficulty level as those used in the experiment. Both 
mazes were posted in front of the classroom during the illustration. Then subjects  were given  five 
                                                        
12 The experimenter said in public, “According to the information from the school‟s registrar office, your 
hukou belongs to [province/city] and it is a(n) [agricultural/non-agricultural] hukou.” When verifying the 
information on date of birth, we did not publicly reveal the year of birth to avoid affecting their self-
confidence given that the subjects were from three different grades.  
13 An ID number was randomly assigned to each subject before they entered the classroom. The numbers 
determined where they sat. The ¥3 participation fee was enclosed in an envelope on each desk. Subjects 
were told that the money was theirs to keep upon arrival. This participation fee was offered up front to 
gain their trust in the incentivized scheme.   
14 The mazes can be found at http://games.yahoo.com/games/maze.html. The difficulty level varies from 
1 (easy) to 5 (hard). The mazes we used were level 2. 18 
 
minutes to practice with an additional maze while the experimenter assisted based on individual needs. 
After the practice round subjects participated in two 15-minute blocks of experiment. In each block, they 
were given a booklet of 15 mazes, and had up to 15 minutes to solve as many as possible. All the thirty 
mazes were of identical difficulty level. The two-block structure of the design allows us to analyze 
efficiency in learning, i.e., how their performance improves over time. It also allows us to compare the 
effects on performance of the homogeneous versus heterogeneous reward regimes.    
The  homogeneous  reward  system  (hereafter  the  Pure  Piece  Rate  regime)  used  piece  rate 
compensation in both blocks – subjects were rewarded with ¥1 for each maze solved correctly. The 
heterogeneous reward system (hereafter the Mixed Tournament regime) consists of piece rate in the first 
block (¥1 per maze), and tournament in the second block in which only the winner was rewarded with 
¥6 per maze and other subjects received zero.
15 The winner was the one who solved the most number of 
mazes in the session. In the case of a tie, each of those subjects who solved the highest number of mazes 
was rewarded with ¥6 per maze.  
Subjects were told that the task consisted of two  blocks. But the instruction for the second block, 
including the payment scheme, was not given until they completed  block one. Therefore, the payment 
structure is identical in block one for the Pure Piece Rate regime and the Mixed Tournament regime. At 
the end of each block maze booklets were collected and left outside the labs  to be  picked up by a 
research assistant and handed to the graders in a separate room. The procedure prevented the graders 
from knowing the subjects‟ identities and hukou status. Since the experimenters never left the labs at any 
point  of  time  during  the  session,  subjects  were  aware  that  their  mazes  were  not  graded  by  their 
experimenters. At the end of block 2 of the maze solving tasks a survey was conducted to collect 
                                                        
15 We use the Mixed Tournament regime, rather than tournament in both blocks, to alleviate the problem 
of earning inequality in the experiment.  19 
 
demographic information. Thereafter, the grading results were handed to the experimenters, subjects 
were  then  informed  about  their  performance  (and  results  of  the  tournament  if  applicable),  paid 
individually in private, and dismissed.  
The experiment was conducted in four public schools in suburban Beijing in May and December 
2007, and December 2008. At each school the experiment included four conditions including the Pure 
Piece Rate control treatment, Pure Piece Rate identity treatment, Mixed Tournament control treatment, 
and Mixed Tournament identity treatment. Table 1 summarizes the features of experimental sessions. All 
the sessions were conducted during class breaks on the days when school was in session, and were 
conducted separately for boys and girls to  control for any potential gender differences. In total we 
conducted 72 sessions, including 48 male sessions and 24 female sessions with mixed hukou types. The 
total number of subjects was 418 or 25 percent of the eligible population in the schools. Each identity 
treatment session lasted approximately one hour whereas each control session lasted about forty five 
minutes.
16 Average earnings per subject were  ¥19.70 for those in the control  treatment and ¥19.60 for 
those in the identity treatment. The average experimental earnings were about three times the  average 
weekly allowance that these students received from their parents.  
The summary statistics presented in Table 2 show no statistical ly significant difference in the 
demographics  and  other  related  variables  between  the  identity  and  control  treatments,  indicating 
successful randomization of students across these experimental treatments. Two thirds of subjects were 
male. Subjects‟ average age was 10 years at the time of participation. About 65 percent of the fathers and 
60 percent of mothers had high school or above education. The average number of other students in an 
                                                        
16 The  instructions  are  adopted  from  Hoff  and  Pandey  (2006)  and  slightly  revised.  The  English 
translation of the experimental instruction and surveys are included in Appendix B – D. 20 
 
experimental session that a subject had prior acquaintance with was 1.4.
17 Among the L hukou students, 
22 percent were born in Beijing. The remaining L subjects had lived in Beijing for 5.5 years on average, 
or more than 50 percent of their current life time. Although the L subjects spoke in a perfect local accent 
and dressed in a way that was indistinguishable from their local counterparts, their self-image was 
highly correlated with their hukou status. According to the survey data, only 9 percent of L subjects 
(compared to 85 percent of H subjects, p < 0.01) considered themselves Beijing locals and only 33 
percent of L subjects compared to 89 percent of H subjects (p < 0.01) expected to be considered a 
Beijing local by their fellow students or teachers. 
 
5.  Results 
In  this  section,  we  will  examine  the  impact  of  publicly  revealing  individuals‟  hukou  identity  on 
individual behavior and economic outcomes. Results are discussed at the end of this section.  
In the analysis, the two blocks in the Pure Piece Rate regime and the first block in the Mixed 
Tournament regime are referred to as the piece rate blocks since they all involve the piece rate payment 
method. The second block in the Mixed Tournament regime is referred to as the tournament block. Data 
in the first blocks of both payment regimes are pooled whenever appropriate because of the identical 
experimental design. For the tests based on aggregate data, the student t test of mean comparison is used 
for male sessions whereas Wilcoxon rank sum test is used for female sessions due to the small number 
of observations. Two tail test p values are reported unless noted otherwise.  
Figure 1 shows the average number of mazes solved by gender and hukou with panel A pertaining 
                                                        
17 This is comparable with the 1.4 average number of subjects a student knew in his session in Hoff and 
Pandey (2006) study. 21 
 
to the first block of both payment regimes, panels B and C pertaining to block 2 of the Pure Piece Rate 
regime and block 2 of the Mixed Tournament regime, respectively. Several observations emerge. Panel 
A shows that conditional on gender there is little difference in the intrinsic ability of maze solving 
between the H and L hukou groups in the baseline control treatment: H boys solved 6.7 mazes compared 
to 6.5 by L boys (p > 0.10); H girls solved 5.6 mazes compared to 5.5 by L girls (p > 0.10). In fact, we 
cannot reject that the H and L subjects are drawn from the same distribution of maze-solving ability (p > 
0.10 for both boys and girls). Therefore, the divergence in performance between the H and L groups, if 
observed in the treatment, can be attributed to the difference in their responses to the hukou identity 
priming.   
We also note that our results as presented in Figure 1 are largely consistent with the findings in the 
gender  gap  literature  that  show  competition  enhances  performance  relative  to  a  noncompetitive 
environment  for  males  but  not  for  females  (Gneezy,  Niederle,  and  Rustichini,  2003;  Gneezy  and 
Rustichini,  2004).  Comparing  subjects‟  performance  in  block  2  between  piece  rate  (panel  B)  and 
tournament (panel C), we find that H boys solve significantly more mazes (8.4 vs. 10.2, p < 0.05), and 
girls solve fewer (8.3 vs. 7.3 for L girls, p > 0.10) or about the same number of mazes (7 vs. 7.2 for H 
girls, p > 0.10) in the tournament. L boys solve fewer mazes in the tournament compared to in the 
noncompetitive environment but the difference is not statistically significant (9.3 vs. 8.6, p > 0.10).  
Since the research question of primary interest in this paper is the influences of hukou identity we 
focus  on  comparisons  between  the  identity  and  control  treatments  next.  In  panels  A  and  B,  the 
comparison between the two treatments implies that under the piece rate payment method the influence 
of hukou on one‟s effort may depend on the H or L hukou type. Specifically, making hukou salient 
increases  the  number  of  mazes  solved  by  H  boys  (6.7  mazes in  the  control  vs.  6.9  in  the  identity 
treatment in block 1, p > 0.10; 8.4 vs. 9.4 in block 2, p > 0.10) and by H girls (5.6 vs. 5.8 in block 1, p > 22 
 
0.10; 7 vs. 7.8 in block 2, p > 0.10); making hukou salient decreases the performance for L boys (6.5 
mazes in the control vs. 5.9 in the identity treatment in block 1, p > 0.10; 5.5 vs. 5 in block 2, p > 0.10) 
and for L girls (9.3 vs. 8.4 in block 1, p > 0.10; 8.3 vs. 6.8 in block 2, p < 0.05). In contrast, panel C 
suggests that the impact of hukou on competitiveness may be contingent on gender. In the tournament 
regime both H and L boys perform less well, and both H and L girls perform better in the identity 
treatment than in the control although these differences in performance are statistically insignificant (p > 
0.10).  
Figure 2 presents subjects‟ earnings in the Pure Piece Rate regime.
18 We find that when the hukou 
background is kept private in the control treatment there is no significant difference in experimental 
earnings between the L and H subjects – this is true for both boys and girls (p > 0.10). This again 
confirms  that  H  and  L  students  do  not  differ  in  their  intrinsic  ability  in  the  task  of  maze  solving. 
However, both L boys and L girls earn significantly less compared to their H counterparts when their 
hukou identity is publicly revealed in the identity treatment. H boys earn an average of ¥16.5, compared 
to ¥14.1 by L boys (p < 0.05). H girls earn an average of ¥13.9, compared to ¥11.9 by L girls (p > 0.10). 
Figure 3 further contrasts the distribution of experimental earnings across the two treatments in terms of 
earnings  percentiles.
19 Panel A shows that revealing  hukou  makes  H  subjects  move  up  the  earning 
distributions (p < 0.10, two-side rank sum test). In contrast, panel B shows that revealing hukou shifts 
                                                        
18 The earnings do not include the ¥3 participation fee. Since ¥1 is paid for each maze under piece rate, 
the numbers presented in Figure 2 equal the average total number of mazes solved in blocks 1 and 2 
under the Pure Piece Rate regime. Subjects‟ earnings under the Mixed Tournament regime are not the 
focus here due to the large variance in earnings because of the winner-take-all rule.  
19 See FigureA1 in the appendix for  similar conclusion when we analyze the  distribution of actual 
experimental earnings in yuans rather than earnings percentile. 23 
 
the rankings of L subjects towards the left tail of the distribution (p < 0.10).
20 These results suggest that 
hukou identity may lower the effort of L type subjects. 
Figure  4  summarizes  subjects‟  improvement  in  maze  solving  ability  over  time,  or  degree  of 
learning, which is measured by the increase in the number of mazes from block 1 to block 2. We find 
that the degree of learning is similar across the two treatments for H boys, H girls, and L boys (p > 0.10). 
However, for L girls, learning is marginally less efficient in the identity treatment (1.7 mazes) than in the 
control (2.7 mazes, p < 0.10) under the Pure Piece Rate regime, and significantly more efficient in the 
identity treatment (3.6 mazes) than in the control (1.9 mazes, p < 0.05) under the Mixed Tournament 
regime.  It  suggests  that  when  the  low  social  status  is  publicly  revealed  for  L  girls  in  the  identity 
treatment,  a  competitive  environment  improves  their  performance  more  effectively  than  a 
noncompetitive environment.
21  
                                                        
20 Note  we  pool  data  of  the  females  and  males  for  each  hukou  type.  The  pattern  is  similar  if  the 
distributions are separated by gender. 
21 This result pertains to an interaction effect of low social status and competitive environment on 
females‟ performance, hence is not contradictory to the main findings in the gender gap literature (e.g., 
Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini, 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004) that implicitly assumes equal 
intra-gender social status. In fact, our results in the control treatment (without the identity prime) are 
largely consistent with the previous findings. In the control treatment, the improvement in performance 
(from block 1 to block 2) is significantly higher for H boys in the Mixed Tournament than in the Pure 
Piece Rate regime (3.0 vs. 2.1, p = 0.05, one-side t test). The improvement in performance across the 
two payment schemes is about the same for H girls (1.4 vs. 1.6) and L boys (2.5 vs. 2.4). For L girls, the 
improvement  in  performance  reduces  from  2.7  in  the  Pure  Piece  Rate  regime  to  1.9  in  the  Mixed 
Tournament  (p  >  0.10).  Unlike  previous  studies,  our  results  suggest  that  a  gender  heterogeneous 24 
 
The  above  results,  based  on  aggregate  statistics,  may  be  confounded  by  unobservable  school 
characteristics. Thus, to further investigate the influences of hukou identity on individual‟s behavior and 
economic outcome, we now turn to regression analyses which allow us to control for unobservable 
school characteristics. We pool data of both H and L subjects, boys and girls so that the impacts of 
publicly  revealing  hukou  identity  can  be  directly  compared  across  hukou  status  and  gender.  The 
following school fixed effect model applies throughout the regression analysis:  
 
Yis = β0 + β1 salient hukoui+ β2 Li+ β3 (Li · salient hukoui) + β4 femalei + β5 (femalei · salient hukoui) + β6 
gradei + β7 block2i + αs + ηis 
 
Yis  denotes  the  dependent  variable  of  interest  -  number  of  mazes  solved,  (experimental)  earnings 
percentile, or learning by individual i in school s. The independent variables include dummy variables 
for the identity treatment variable (salient hukou), low hukou type (L) (the omitted category is the H 
type), and gender (female). The treatment variable Salient hukou is interacted with L (or gender) to allow 
the impact of revealing hukou identity to differ with one‟s hukou type (or gender). In addition, we 
control for grade, and block 2 when applicable.
22 School fixed effects, αs, control for unobservable, 
school-specific characteristics. ηis is the error term. The regression results are presented in Table 3.
23  
We first investigate individual performance   in solving  mazes.  The dependent variable  is  the 
number of mazes solved. Column 1 of Table 3 focuses on the piece rate payment method which includes 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
response to a competitive environment may be contingent on one‟s status in the societal hierarchy. More 
discussion of this result is provided at the end of this section.  
22 The correlation between grade and subjects‟ age is 0.7 (p < 0.01). Results are consistent using age or 
grade. However, using grade yields a higher (adjusted) R
2. 
23 An ordered probit model is used in column (4) and OLS is used in all other columns. 25 
 
both blocks of the Pure Piece Rate regime and block 1 of the Mixed Tournament regime. We include a 
dummy variable block 2 to control for learning. Since each subject in the Pure Piece Rate regime is 
associated with two observations standard errors are clustered at the individual level to take account of 
the  interdependence  of  these  observations.  Column  2  focuses  on  the  tournament  block.  Results  in 
column 1 show that in the piece rate blocks, making hukou salient insignificantly increases H group‟s 
effort (coefficient 0.300, p > 0.10). However, it significantly decreases the L group‟s effort since the 
coefficients of salient hukou and its interaction with L suggest that L subjects solved 0.772 (p < 0.01) 
less mazes in the identity treatment than in the control.
24 This impact is both statistically significant and 
economically substantial. Given that the L group solved 7.6 mazes on average in the two blocks of the 
Pure Piece Rate regime in the control treatment, this effect of hukou identity can be interpreted as a 10 
percent drop in effort by the L group.  In the tournament block (column 2), the  hukou identity has 
insignificant impact on one‟s competitiveness for the H and L groups (p > 0.10). In both columns 1-2, 
the effects of other covariates are consistent with our expectations. Boys solved more mazes than girls. 
The higher the grade, the better is the individual‟s performance. The covariate block 2 enters with a 
significantly positive sign, suggesting an improvement in performance over time due to learning.  
The above analysis leads to our first result.  
Result 1 (Effort). In the piece rate blocks when one‟s hukou identity is made salient, the L subjects 
significantly reduce their effort level, and the H subjects insignificantly increase their effort level.  
 
Result 1 implies that one‟s hukou identity, when publicly revealed, may distort individual‟s effort 
level in response to incentives. What does this distortion entail regarding the income distribution across 
                                                        
24 The coefficients of salient hukou and its interaction with L  are 0.300 and -1.072, respectively. It 
suggests that the impact of publicly revealing hukou on L hukou group‟s effort is 0.772 (p < 0.01).   26 
 
different hukou groups?  Presume that the control treatment simulates the „state‟ without hukou whereas 
the treatment condition simulates the „state‟ with hukou. If we then rank subjects (regardless of gender 
and hukou background) based on their experimental earnings in the control and the identity treatment, 
respectively, any difference in the distribution of earnings between the two states can be inferred as 
evidence of the impact of the hukou system in distorting individuals‟ response to incentives.
 Descriptive 
statistics on earnings percentiles (Figure 3) show that 53 percent of H subjects and 38 percent of L 
subjects rank below the median earning in the control treatment, whereas 41 percent of H subjects and 
58 percent of L subjects rank below the median earning in the treatment condition.
25 This suggests that 
the number of L subjects in the low earning bracket rises due to their reduced effort (p < 0.05, two-side 
test of proportion) in the state with hukou.  
To check the robustness of this finding we run a regression analysis in column 3 of Table 3 with 
subject‟s earnings percentile as the dependent variable. The coefficient of salient hukou is 7.458 (p > 
0.10), suggesting that priming hukou identity insignificantly increases H hukou group‟s ranking in the 
earnings distribution. The sum of the coefficients of salient hukou and its interaction with L (-11.74, p < 
0.05) suggests that publicly revealing one‟s hukou identity significantly decreases a migrant student‟s 
ranking in the earnings distribution by 11.74 percentiles.
 In column (4) we also report the results from an 
ordered probit regression with four earnings categories (see Figure 3) as the dependent variables.
26 The 
results are consistent with those in column (3). We also find that girls generally ranked lower than boys 
                                                        
25 The median earning (excluding the participation fee) in both the control and the treatment conditions 
is ¥15. The average earning is ¥14.51 in the control condition, and ¥14.52 in the treatment condition.   
26 The dependent variable „earnings distribution category‟ in column (4) takes values of 1, 2, 3 and 4 if 
one‟s earning in the Pure Piece Rate regime is below the 25





th, and above the 75
th percentile of the distribution. 27 
 
(p < 0.01), and students from higher grades ranked higher than those from lower grades (p < 0.01). This 
finding leads us to result 2. 
 
Result 2 (Earnings distribution). Under the Pure Piece Rate regime, priming hukou identity significantly 
decrease the L type subjects‟ ranking, and insignificantly increases the H type subjects‟ ranking in the 
earnings distribution. 
 
The results for learning are presented in column 5 (the Pure Piece Rate regime), columns 6 and 7 
(the Mixed Tournament regime) of Table 3. The dependent variable is the increase of the number of 
mazes from block 1 to block 2. Column 5 shows that making hukou salient does not affect subjects‟ 
learning under the Pure Piece Rate regime (p > 0.10). For the Mixed Tournament regime, we add the 
salient hukou and female interaction term in column 7 since the summary statistics in Figure 4 suggest 
that the impact of hukou identity on learning may vary across different gender groups. Results in column 
7 show that under the Mixed Tournament regime hukou identity affects the learning efficiency of girls 
but not boys. Specifically, learning is 1.22 mazes (p < 0.05) higher for L girls and 1.02 mazes (p < 0.10) 
higher for H girls in the identity treatment than in the control, both representing 63 percent increase in 
learning efficiency compared to the control treatment.
27 In addition, we find that the extent of learning is 
on average lower for girls than for boys (p < 0.10 in column 5; p > 0.10 in columns 6 and 7). The higher 
the grade a student was in, the better the learning was (p < 0.01). This leads us to result 3.   
 
Result 3 (Learning).  Under the Mixed Tournament regime priming hukou identity improves subjects‟ 
learning efficiency significantly for L girls and marginally for H girls.   
                                                        
27 In the control condition under the Mixed Tournament regime, the increase in the number of mazes 
from blocks 1 to 2 is 1.93 mazes for L girls and 1.60 mazes for H girls. 28 
 
 
While results 1-3 focus on the impact of hukou identity on individual behavior and earnings we 
next ask whether the hukou system affects aggregate production efficiency. In this study, aggregate 
production efficiency can be measured in terms of the average total number of mazes solved by all the 
subjects (regardless of hukou types) or per group in an experimental session. However, since some 
sessions had fewer than six subjects due to school absence of some pre-selected subjects, we use the 
average  number of  mazes solved per subject to  evaluate  production efficiency  of sessions. Table  4 
provides a summary on this measure of efficiency along with the p values of the test of means. Data in 
the  first  block  of  the  Pure  Piece  Rate  regime  and  the  Mixed  Tournament  regime  are  pooled  again 
because of the identical design. We find that per capita mazes solved are similar across the control and 
the identity treatments regardless of gender and payment regime. In some cases (e.g., block 1 for male 
and female groups) per capita mazes solved are  slightly lower in the identity treatment than in the 
control; in other cases (e.g., block 2 piece rate for the male group, block 2 tournament for the female 
group) they are slightly higher in the identity treatment than in the control. In all cases the difference 
between the identity treatment and the control is statistically insignificant (p > 0.10). This suggests that 
the positive impact of hukou on the H status group and its negative impact on the L status group are 
counterbalanced, and the hukou system may not affect aggregate productivity. We, therefore, conclude 
that:  
 
Result 4 (Aggregate production efficiency). The presence of the hukou institution does not affect the 
aggregate production efficiency regardless of the payment regime. 
 
Discussions of Results 29 
 
Our results indicate that individuals‟ behavior is distorted by the hukou institution in terms of their 
response to incentives. This suggests that the practice of permanently assigning households to a rural 
status and discriminating against them for half a century has profoundly shaped citizens‟ social identities, 
especially  for  the  socially  „excluded‟  hukou  groups  in  China.  This  social  identity  may  have  been 
internalized by children of rural migrants in urban areas thereby adversely impacting their performance 
on cognitive tasks. It is, thus, probable that their educational performance as well as their outcomes in 
the  labor  market  may  be  negatively  affected.  While  the  literature  in  development  economics  and 
transitional  economics  attributes  China‟s  intra-urban  income  inequality  to  the  disparity  in  resource 
allocations due to the discriminatory system, this study suggests that the internalized inferior social 
identity may serve as another avenue through which the hukou system exacerbates intra-urban income 
inequality in China. 
Our results may be explained by stereotype threat, a well-established finding in social psychology. 
The stereotype threat literature show that making social identity salient in a laboratory often makes 
subjects behave  consistently  with  the  stereotypes associated with  that  social  group, and  hence  may 
activate the negative stereotypes and hurt subjects‟ performance in relevant tasks. For example, Steele 
and  Aronson  (1995)  find  that  African  Americans  who  are  stereotyped  to  be  poor  students 
underperformed on academic tests when they were asked to indicate their race prior to taking the test. 
Similar findings on underperformance are documented for Hispanic Americans in Aronson, Quinn and 
Spencer (1998), and are extended to individuals from low socio-economic background by Croizet and 
Claire (1998). Since rural workers generally migrate from economically less developed areas to more 
developed ones for better work opportunities in China, these rural migrants are generally stereotyped to 
be “uneducated, ignorant, dirty and having higher propensities to be criminals” (Wang and Zuo, 1999). 
Migrant  children  are  stereotyped  to  be  less  intelligent  and  have  low  academic  achievement.  These 30 
 
negative stereotypes may be reinforced repeatedly and internalized by the migrant students. In our study, 
this self-image may be activated for migrant students following the priming of their „inferior‟ hukou 
background, and may prevent these students from performing to their full potential in the assigned tasks.  
There are two other possible explanations for  identity impacts addressed by Hoff and Pandey 
(2004). First, the intimidation effect, i.e., knowing that they are evaluated along with their local urban 
counterparts may hurt migrant students‟ self confidence in the identity treatment. This is unlikely to be 
the primary driver of the results in this paper for the following reasons. In Hoff and Pandey‟s study, 
subjects were recruited individually from their homes in different villages, and were transported to the 
laboratory set up at a local junior high school the next day. The experiments were conducted while 
schools were closed. This recruiting process and logistical arrangement was more likely to introduce an 
intimidation factor when subjects‟ castes were publicly revealed in the identity treatment, compared to 
the control treatment in which their castes were kept private.
28 In contrast, our subjects were recruited 
from schools where migrant students and their local urban counterparts studied and interacted on a daily 
basis. All the experimental sessions were conducted at subjects‟ regular schools during class breaks on 
days when their school was in session. Therefore, the intimidation factor, if any, is held constant across 
the control and the identity treatments because subjects were randomly assigned to the sessions. As a 
result, the findings based on the comparison across the two treatments should be net of the intimidation 
effect. In addition, the substantial increase in migrant girls‟ competitiveness in the tournament regime in 
the identity treatment indicates that our results are least likely to be driven by the intimidation factor.  
The second hypothesis is experimenter discretion, i.e., in our case, L subjects may expect to be 
discriminated by the experimenters, all of who spoke Chinese Mandarin with an urban accent and may 
                                                        
28 The authors control for this possibility by running extra pure-caste sessions that consisted of either the 
high or the low caste, and comparing the results with those in the mixed-caste sessions. 31 
 
have been perceived as Beijing locals. There are two reasons why we discount this possibility. First, as 
pointed out in the discussion of experiment design, only the experimenters in a session knew the hukou 
status of each assigned ID. However, the maze puzzle booklets, after each block, were handed to graders 
outside the laboratory who did not know the hukou status of any ID number. The experimenters did not 
leave the laboratory throughout the session. Although the grading procedure was not announced to the 
subjects in advance, we conjecture that the subjects were aware, particularly in block 2 of a session, that 
the  experimenters  were  present  in  the  laboratory  throughout  and  unlikely  to  influence  the  grading 
process.  Second, the above belief is borne out by the data as well. For instance, if our results were 
driven by experimenter discretion in  the piece rate payment method we would observe a lower degree 
of performance reduction (when identity was publicly revealed) in block 2 than in block 1, since in 
block 2 subjects knew for certain that the experimenters were unlikely to influence the grading process. 
Nevertheless, we observe the opposite, i.e., the reduction in performance is actually higher in block 2. 
Figure 1 shows that for L boys the performance reduction from the identity treatment to the control is 
0.6 in block 1 (p < 0.10, one-side t test of mean comparison) and 0.9 in block 2 (p < 0.10, one-side t test 
of mean comparison).  The corresponding performance reduction is 0.5 (p > 0.10, one-side Wilcoxon 
rank sum test) and 1.5 (p < 0.05, one-side Wilcoxon rank sum test) for L girls. This suggests that 
experimenter discretion is unlikely to be a contributing factor in our results. 
Our findings also suggest that migrant girls are more likely to improve their learning efficiency in 
competition in response to the public revelation of their inferior socio-economic status. As noted earlier 
in  the  paper,  this  result  focuses  on  an  interaction  effect  of  inferior  social  status  and  competitive 
environment on females‟ performance, which extends the previous findings that competition enhances 
performance relative to a noncompetitive environment for males but not for females (Gneezy, Niederle, 
and Rustichini, 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004). We conjecture that our result may be explained by 32 
 
the twin identity of being of the female gender and of L hukou status. Typically, migrant girls have to 
face dual discrimination in their lives – discrimination against rural migrants and gender discrimination. 
It is well accepted that in traditional Chinese society boys are preferred to girls and parents are likely to 
invest more in boys‟ education than girls‟. This gender bias is more apparent in the rural areas than in 
the  urban  areas  (Park  and  Rukumnuaykit,  2004)  and  in  rural  migrant  families  than  in  local  urban 
families. In addition, rural families are more likely to have an additional child if the first child is a girl. 29 
Therefore, compared to other students, migrant girls are on average more likely to have siblings and 
thereby  more  likely  to  compete  for  allocation  of  intra-household  resources.  Specifically,  given  the 
higher opportunity costs of sending girls to school for migrant parents, it is possible that if these girls do 
not excel academically, relative to their brothers, parents may discontinue their education. For these 
reasons we presume that migrant girls exert greater effort in a competitive environment which enhances 
                                                        
29 In a study of childbearing behavior of rural-urban migrants in Shenzhen, Feldman, Haifeng, Shuzhuo 
and Xiaoyi (2008) finds that the sex ratio of migrant children is as high as 163 male births per 100 
female births while it is 118 per 100 female births for mainland China, on average. They also found that 
the later in the birth order, the higher the sex ratio for the child, i.e., the sex ratio is 1.52 for the first birth 
and rises steeply to 1.80 for the second birth, peaking at 1.94 for the third and above birth. This suggests 
that migrants have a stronger son preference than an average Chinese. Further, under China‟s One Child 
Policy rural families are currently allowed to have an additional child subject to government approvals, 
if the first child is a girl, in some provinces subject to income or health constraints. Rural migrant 
households are also more likely to „illegally‟ have additional children than local urban households since 
many rural migrants do not register with the local government in their host cities, which makes it more 
difficult for the government to monitor the number of child births among rural migrants. 33 
 
their  learning  efficiency  in  the  Mixed  Tournament  games.  However,  more  research  needs  to  be 
conducted to explore this result further. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
We conduct an experimental study to investigate the causal impact of social identity on individuals‟ 
response to economic incentives. We answer this question in the context of the role of China‟s household 
registration or  hukou system in generating migrant identity. Our results indicate that making hukou 
identity salient adversely affects the performance of rural migrants who are lower ranked hukou holders. 
This adverse impact is significant and substantial for rural migrants. Making individuals‟ hukou status 
salient and public reduces the performance of rural migrant children on assigned tasks by 10 percent. 
The performance of individuals with a Beijing hukou improves, but insignificantly, when hukou status is 
made salient. Although the impact of hukou identity on aggregate efficiency is insignificant, the reduced 
effort of rural  migrants in the  identity treatment suggests a shift in the earnings distribution to the 
disadvantage of rural hukou holders - the percentage of rural migrants below the 25
th percentile of 
earnings in the experimental games increases by almost 19 percentage points. 
The findings in this paper are consistent with Hoff and Pandey‟s (2006) results on caste identities 
in  India  which  show  that  publicly  revealing  young  male  students‟  caste  significantly  decreases  the 
performance of the low castes. While they focus on male students this study shows that similar results 
also  hold  for  low  status  female  students.  The  evidence  in  this  paper,  thus  underlines  the  effect  of 
institutionally  created  social  identity  in  distorting  individuals‟  intrinsic  response  to  incentives  and 
thereby playing a role in generating inequality in the distribution of gains from economic growth in a 
developing country. Our study also contributes to the literature by broadening the perspectives on social 
identities beyond race, ethnicity, religion, or caste. It shows that even in an ethnically homogenous 34 
 
society like China, several-decades-long systemic policy of social exclusion can play a powerful role in 
creating identities and in turn influence individual behavior.  
As suggested by Akerlof and Kranton‟s (2000) identity model of exclusion, the negative impacts 
of  social  exclusion  are  unlikely  to  disappear  unless  citizens  are  fully  integrated  into  a  community.  
Future research should, thus, study the long term impacts of identity on educational attainment and labor 
market outcomes of low status individuals. This strand of research will provide critical insights for 
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Table 1: Experimental Design 
 
Treatments  Primed hukou? 
Reward per maze  Number of sessions  
Block 1  Block 2  Male  Female 
1. Pure Piece Rate control treatment  No  ¥1  ¥1  9  6 
2.  Mixed  Tournament  control 
treatment  No  ¥1  ¥6; winner takes all  9  5 
3. Pure Piece Rate identity treatment  Yes  ¥1  ¥1  15  7 
4.  Mixed  Tournament  identity 
treatment  Yes  ¥1  ¥6; winner takes all  15  6 





Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variables 
Control Treatment  Identity Treatment 
Two-side p value 
a 
Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs. 
Grade  4.28  1.04  168  4.37  1.10  250  0.41 
Age (years)  9.84  1.32  168  9.80  1.27  250  0.76 
Mazes (block 1)  6.19  2.44  168  6.10  2.27  250  0.71 
Mazes (block 2)  8.46  2.87  168  8.56  2.84  250  0.74 
Total earnings 
b  19.70  21.26  168  19.60  20.77  250  0.96 
Years of local residence 
c  5.78  3.40  63  5.60  2.85  91  0.73 
Father‟s education               
High school  0.42  0.50  156  0.38  0.49  247  0.35 
College/Graduate degree  0.25  0.43  156  0.25  0.43  247  0.98 
Mother‟s education               
High school   0.40  0.49  155  0.35  0.48  246  0.27 
College/Graduate degree  0.23  0.42  155  0.24  0.43  246  0.68 
Fraction  of  subjects  who 
played  similar/same 
games before 
0.73  0.45  168  0.68  0.47  250  0.28 
Number of others known  1.39  1.47  165  1.36  1.28  250  0.80 
Notes:  
a. The two-side p values are based on the t test of means or proportions. 
b.  Total experimental earnings include the ¥3 participation fee.  
c. Years of local residence are for those who were not born in Beijing. 39 
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Maze earnings distribution 
A: H boys and girls 
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Table 3: Impact of Hukou Identity on Performance, Earnings and Learning 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Empirical model  OLS  OLS  OLS  Ordered 
probit  OLS  OLS  OLS 





Learning  Learning  Learning 




Pure  Piece 
Rate 
regime 
Pure  Piece 
Rate 
Regime 









salient hukou   0.300  -0.297  7.458  0.175  0.166  0.314  -0.055 
   (identity)  (0.360)  (0.556)  (5.103)  (0.216)  (0.388)  (0.401)  (0.448) 
L  0.386  -0.673  9.185  0.279  0.780*  -0.144  -0.162 
  (0.361)  (0.561)  (5.596)  (0.234)  (0.426)  (0.432)  (0.430) 
L × salient hukou   -1.072**  0.421  -19.198***  -0.701**  -0.479  0.186  0.195 
  (0.457)  (0.726)  (7.219)  (0.304)  (0.549)  (0.558)  (0.555) 
female  -1.046***  -1.313***  -13.935***  -0.498***  -0.551*  -0.460  -1.045** 
  (0.251)  (0.395)  (4.023)  (0.170)  (0.306)  (0.319)  (0.453) 
famale  ×  salient 
hukou               1.075* 
(0.596) 
               
               
grade  0.797***  1.112***  9.653***  0.347***  0.367***  0.360***  0.342*** 
  (0.105)  (0.165)  (1.705)  (0.074)  (0.130)  (0.131)  (0.131) 
block 2  2.283***             
  (0.155)             
Constant  3.139***  4.896***  11.575    0.340  0.530  0.894 
  (0.559)  (0.916)  (9.443)    (0.718)  (0.750)  (0.772) 
Observations  635  201  217  217  217  201  201 
Adjusted R
2  0.304  0.264  0.184  0.067  0.036  0.031  0.042 
Notes: Ordered probit analysis in column (1) is based on the Pure Piece Rate regime and block 1 of the Mixed 
Tournament  regime.  Standard  errors  in  the  parentheses  are  clustered  at  the  individual  level  when  multiple 
observations come from the same individual. Analysis in column (2) is based on block 2 of the mixed tournament 
regime. Consistent with Figure 3, the dependent variable “earnings distribution category” in column (4) takes values 
of 1, 2, 3 and 4 if one‟s earning is below the 25
th percentile, between the 25
th and 50




th percentile of the earnings distribution. School fixed effects are included in all the analyses.  











Table 4: Impact of Hukou Identity on Economic Efficiency 
Gender 
Block 1 (all piece rate)  Block 2 piece rate  Block 2 tournament 
control  identity  p value  control  identity  p value  control  identity  p value 
Boys  6.6  6.41  0.53  8.85  8.87  0.97  9.35  9.03  0.53 
Girls  5.54  5.39  0.69  7.63  7.27  0.50  7.27  8.12  0.22 
Notes: Two-side p-values are based on the t test of means for boys, and the Wilcoxon rank sum test for girl45 
 
 
Appendix A. A Sample Maze Game 
 
Maze             Solution 
   
 
 
Appendix B. Experimental Instruction 
 
The  instruction  was  given  in  Chinese.  The  English  translation  is  presented  below  with  the  instructions  for 
experimenters included in the parentheses in italics.  
 
I. Piece rate without hukou primed 
 
1. Welcome! Each of you will be compensated with 3 yuan for your participation. Please find 3 yuan in the 
envelope on your desk. It is yours to keep.  
 
2. In addition, you may earn more money in the games. The average earnings will be about 12 to 18 yuan. You 
will be paid in cash in private at the end of the games. You are under no obligation to let others know how much 
you earn. You will participate in two rounds of maze solving games. The entire games will last about half an hour. 
Please do not talk to each other during the experiment. Please raise your hand if you had any questions.  
 
3. First, we will show you what the game looks like and how to solve it. (Experimenter reveals the first sample 
maze and explains while drawing on the poster.) On the left hand side of the maze, it is the entrance indicated by a 
triangle flag. On the right hand side, it is the exit indicated by a square flag. The black lines are walls. Your task is 
to find a path from the entrance to the exit without crossing the walls. You may erase or cross out if you make any 
mistakes. 
 
4. Let‟s look at the second example. It is similar to what you will need to solve in the games. (Experimenter 
reveals the second example and illustrates how to solve it).  
 
5. Now you will be given another maze for practice. Everyone will have 5 minutes to do so. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand and we will come to you. (Experimenter offers individual assistance to those 
who need help.) 
 
6. Next, we will start the first round of the games. Please find the booklet that says „Round 1‟ on the cover. Please 
don‟t open the booklet until you are told to do so. There is one maze on each page, and in total 15 games. 
Everyone will be given 15 minutes to solve as many games as you can. You don‟t need to solve those games in 
order. You may skip any game as you like.  46 
 
 
7. Now we will explain the rewards. For this round, you will get 1 yuan for each maze you solve correctly. So if 
you solve one, you will get one yuan. If you solve two, you will get two yuan … 
 
(Experimenter reveals the following table on the blackboard and goes through this hypothetical example to make 
sure every subject follows the calculation of rewards. Experimenter asks subject no. 1, ‘suppose Qiang solve 4 
mazes, how much he will earn?’  Then experimenter asks subject no. 2 how much Gang will earn… Hypothetical 
female names are used in the table if it is female session.) 
 
Name  Number of mazes solved  Rewards 
Qiang  4   
Gang  7   
Peng  9   
Wei  12   
Hao  14   
Dong  5   
 
 
8.  Recall you will have 15 minutes to solve as many mazes as you can. When 5 minutes remain we will let you 
know. When time is up, please put down the pencil immediately and close the booklet. Please open the booklet 
now. You may start. (Experimenter collects the booklet when round 1 is over.) 
 
9. Next we will explain the games in round 2. Please find the booklet that says „Round 2‟ on the cover. Please 
don‟t open it until you are told to do so. The booklet contains another 15 games with the same difficulty level.  
 
10-PieceRate. The rules and rewards in round 2 are exactly the same as that in round 1. Let‟s review the reward 
calculation again. (Experimenter reviews the reward table above without checking with individual subjects.) 
 
11. Again you will have 15 minutes to solve as many mazes as you can. We will let you know when 5 minutes are 
left. Please open the booklet now. You may start. (Experimenter collects the booklet when round 2 is over.) 
 
12. Please find the booklet that says „Survey‟ on the cover. While we are grading your games and computing your 
payoffs please complete the survey. Please try to answer as many questions as you can. We are not going to share 
individual answers with anyone else including your teachers.  
 
13. You will now be paid in private. Remember you don‟t have to tell others how much you earned. Thank you for 
your participation in our study! 
 
II. Tournament without hukou primed 
 
(Replace step 10-PieceRate above with step 10-Tournament below. Keep other steps the same as in Piece Rate.) 
 
10-Tournament. Please note that the rules now are different from round 1. In this round, you will compete with 
each other. Only the winner(s) will get rewards. The winner(s) is/are the person(s) who solve(s) the greatest 
number of mazes. The reward for the winner(s) is 6 yuan each game. So if he solves one maze, he will get 6 yuan. 
If he solves two mazes, he will get 12 yuan. If he solves three mazes, he will get 18 yuan… If it‟s a tie, all the 
winners will be compensated. Each of them will get 6 yuan per game. Let‟s go over one example. 
 
Name  Number of mazes solved  Winner  Rewards 
Qiang  4     
Gang  7     47 
 
Peng  9     
Wei  12     
Hao  14     
Dong  5     
 
(Experimenter adds one more column ‘winner’ in the reward calculation table. Experimenter checks with each 
subject, e.g., ‘Is Qiang the winner? How much does he earn in this case?’) 
 
III. Piece rate with hukou primed 
 
(Same as I. except that Step 0 is added.) 
 
0. Welcome! Each of you will be compensated with 3 yuan for your participation. Please find 3 yuan in the 
envelope on your desk. It is yours to keep. Now please find the booklet that says „Survey 1‟ on the cover.  Please 
try to answer as many questions as you can. We will keep your answers confidential and will not share them with 
anyone else including your teachers. (After everyone completes the survey, experimenter goes to each student, and 
verifies in public their names, month and date of birth, and hukou information. Students nod and say yes if 
information is correct.)  
 
IV. Mixed Tournament with Hukou Announced 
The same as Mixed Tournament except that Step 0 is added. 
 
V.A. Mixed Tournament with Hukou Announced, and H Only  
The same as Mixed Tournament except that Step 0 is added. Note there are 6 Beijing urban students (H) in this 
session. 
 
V.B. Mixed Tournament with Hukou Announced, and M Only 
The same as Mixed Tournament except that Step 0 is added. Note there are 6 Non-Beijing urban students (M) in 
this session. 
 
V.C. Mixed Tournament with Hukou Announced, and L Only 




Appendix C. Pre-experimental Survey (used in the HL treatment) 
 
1. Place of birth:  _____province ____city ____street/village 
2. If you were not born in Beijing, when did you move to Beijing? ______ year  
3. The location of your hukou: _____province _____city ______street/village 
 Check here if you don‟t know the answer.  
5. Which dialect do you speak with your parents at home? 
a) Beijing dialect, b) Other, please specify ______ 
6. Do you consider yourself as Beijing local? 
a) Yes, b) Somewhat, c) No, d) Don‟t know  
7. Do your classmates consider you as Beijing local? 
a) Yes, b) Somewhat, c) No, d) Don‟t know  
8. Do your teachers consider you as Beijing local? 
a) Yes, b) Maybe, c) No, d) Don‟t know  
9. Were you charged 40 yuan rural guest student fee or 80 yuan local student fee at the beginning of this semester? 
a) 40 yuan (rural guest student fee), b) 80 yuan (local student fee), c) other ______ 
10. Where do the students come from in your class?  
a) All from Beijing, b) Most from Beijing, and some from elsewhere,  
c) Some from Beijing, and most from elsewhere, d) Don‟t know 
11. Compare Beijing local students and those from non-Beijing rural areas, what are your opinions regarding the 
following questions? 
i) Who generally study harder? 
a) Beijing local students, b) Students from non-Beijing rural areas,  
c) They study equally hard. 
ii) Who are more active participating in classes, e.g., ask and answer questions?  
a) Beijing local students, b) Students from non-Beijing rural areas,  
c) They are equally active in class participation. 
iii) Who are more active participating in extracurricular activities? 
a) Beijing local students, b) Students from non-Beijing rural areas,  
c) They are equally active in those activities. 
iv) Who are thriftier with money? 
a) Beijing local students, b) Students from non-Beijing rural areas,  

















Appendix D. Post-experimental Survey
30  
 
1. Place of birth:  _______province ______city _______street/village 
2. If you were not born in Beijing, when did you move to Beijing? ______ year  
3. The location of your hukou: _______province ______city _______street/village 
 Check here if you don‟t know the answer.  
4. Your father‟s employer:  
a) Government, including military, b) State owned company, c) Privately owned company,  
d) Foreign invested enterprises, e) Self-employed, f) Others, please specify: ______ 
5. Your father‟s highest level of education achieved: 
a) Elementary school, b) Middle school, c) High school, d) College, e) University, f) Graduate school 
6. Your mother‟s employer:  
a) Government, including military, b) State owned company, c) Privately owned company,  
d) Foreign invested enterprises, e) Self-employed, f) Others, please specify: ______ 
7. Your mother‟s highest level of education achieved: 
a) Elementary school, b) Middle school, c) High school, d) College, e) University, f) Graduate school 
8. Your average ranking in your class is: 
a) Top 25%, b) 25%-50%, c) 50%-75%, d) 75%-100 %, e) don‟t know for sure 
9. Do you like living in the current residential area? 
a) Like it very much, b) Like, c) neutral, d) Dislike, e) Dislike it very much 
10. Where will you want to live when growing up? 
a) Beijing, b) Your hometown, please specify ______,  
c) Other cities in China, please specify ______, d) Foreign country, please specify ______ 
11. What is your ideal job when growing up? 
12. How much pocket money do your parents give to you per week? (Please exclude the expense on meals and 
transportation) 
a) Less than 3.5 yuan, b) 3.5-7 yuan, c) 7-10.5 yuan, d) 10.5-14 yuan, e) more than 14 yuan 
13. Have you ever played this kind of maze game before? 
a) No, b) Played similar games before, c) Played exactly the same games before 
14. How hard did you think these maze games were? 
a) Very hard, b) Hard, c) Neutral, d) Easy, e) Very easy 
15. How many other students in this session do you know by name? 
a) 0, b)1, c) 2, d) 3, e) 4, f) 5  
                                                        






Figure A1: Hukou Identity and Earnings under the Pure Piece Rate Regime 
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